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1.1. BACKGROUND
1.1 Background
Nowadays, computers communicate over the network mainly via Internet
Protocol version 4 (IPv4). This protocol was proposed in 1981 and has been
the standard for communications using TCP/IP architecture. In the last
years, there was a significant increase in demand for IPv4 addresses as a
result of new network devices and the amount of connected people. The most
significant limitation of IPv4 is probably the narrow address space resulting
from the limited possible combinations of a 32-bit address. Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA) already assigned the last IPv4 addresses block1.
In the meanwhile, several Request for Comments (RFC) and documents have
been written describing its successor, Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6).
It is not reasonably expected that all IPv4 devices can be easily changed
to IPv6. Therefore, significant efforts are being made, not only in IPv6
specification, but also in defining strategies and mechanisms for a graceful
transition phase. One of those transition strategies, provides a framework to
translating addresses and packets between both versions.
This thesis, written under an internship in Philips Healthcare, Hamburg,
covers the problem of enabling IPv6 communications in IPv4 legacy medical
devices. mShield is a physical firewall developed by Philips to operate in a
hospital environment. Its role is to protect medical devices from network
based attacks. Currently it only supports IPv4.
Given the need for IPv6 transition, the next releases of mShield should
also perform IPv4 to IPv6 conversion. This allows legacy medical devices
to communicate with IPv6 hospital devices. Developing a medical device
requires significant effort and costs, and therefore, it is not feasible to update
each legacy device to IPv6.
Nevertheless, the problem is not just about enabling the converter function. It
is important to understand that medical devices are operated in environments
where it is necessary to protect sensitive patient data.
1Full announcement by the Number Resource Organization (NRO) [2]
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1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
1.2 Problem Statement
In this thesis, the need to move towards IPv6 is assumed. Moreover, in a
medical context it is important to analyse the security implications of a new
protocol. This study provides a comprehensive answer to the question:
What is the security impact of making mShield an IPv4 to IPv6
converter box ?
The change involves not only the converter role but also the support for both
Internet Protocol (IP) versions (e.g. IPv6 to IPv6 communications). It is
necessary to analyse the security issues arising from the change and compare
them with the current design.
Even though restricted to mShield and its context, this study can be used as
a reference in other studies regarding IPv4 to IPv6 translation covering the
topic from the theory to practical implementation.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
In addition to this chapter, the thesis is composed of the following chapters:
Chapter 2 is composed of two parts: IPv6 and security theory reviews. It
describes the main topics of IPv6 as well as some of the differences of IPv4
version. One of the focus regards the transition mechanisms, and particularly,
the translation strategy used, NAT64. Additionally, a discussion about the
vantages and disadvantages of the use of several mechanisms are also provided
(e.g. stateless versus stateful address translation). At the end, an overview of
the security concepts used in the security analysis is also presented.
Chapter 3 is composed of tree parts: the methodology used, the environment
description and the security analysis itself. The methodology includes a
description of all performed steps as well as the terminology used during
the security analysis. In the environment section, mShield, the medical
devices network and customer network as well as features and constraints of
the environment are described. Finally, in the security analysis, a security
discussion of the issues that affect mShield is provided. Namely the effect of
introducing a new IP version. The analysis takes into account the requirements
3
1.3. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
for the converter box and discusses the security effect of the possibilities for
a new design. The assets and threats identified are presented in this chapter.
At the end of the analysis, a risk assessment describing and measuring the
impact and the likelihood of each threat is also presented. The analysis is
based on a quantitative and qualitative analysis relating to each threat with
known security threats and most common attacks.
Chapter 4 provides a detailed description of a new mShield design. It is
proposed, based on the previous security discussion and the requirements
for the converter process. It also contains a detailed description of its
implementation. In adition to that, based on the implementation, practical
tests are discussed.
Chapter 5 provides a picture of each chapter, highlighting the most relevant
conclusions. An overall conclusion of the research question is also provided.
In the conclusion, the main contributions and the further work are described.
The thesis ends with some final thoughts about the developed work.
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2.1. IPV6 IN A NUTSHELL
2.1 IPv6 in a nutshell
The differences between IPv4 and IPv6, IPv6 addressing architecture or IPv6
header format are explained in this section. Those IPv6 basics topics will
help to understand the next topics and chapters of this thesis.
2.1.1 Overview
The IPv6 specification is defined as a draft standard [3] by Internet Engi-
neering Task Force (IETF). The main differences between IPv4 and IPv6
are:
• Increase of addressing possibilities (due to the 128 bits address length
compared with 32 bits in IPv4).
• Header simplification, the number of field in the base header was reduced
increasing the processing speed of packets.
• New concept of Extension Headers to carry additional options used by
non-IP but IP-related protocols.
• New Field, Flow Label, allows to group a set of packets as a flow,
improving the packet processing for the same flow. This processing
improvement is only valid for infrastructure devices, like routers. Some
applications or infrastructure devices do not make any use of this field
resulting in a normal processing speed.
• Authentication and Privacy features are defined as part of the base
protocol using Internet Protocol security (IPsec).
2.1.2 Addressing
The most visible change, regardless the address length, is probably related to
broadcast which is not used in IPv6. It was replaced by multicast functions
using pre-defined addresses.
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Syntax
An IPv6 address can be written by eight groups of four hexadecimal digits
separated by colons. In IPv4 the representation is made in dotted decimal
notation using four groups between 0 to 255, e.g. 255.255.255.0.
In order to simplify the address configuration from an user perspective,
the addresses can also be written in a short format omitting leading or
trailing zeros. The prefix notation syntax is similar to IPv4 CIDR ( prefix /
prefix-length ). Some IPv6 addresses examples are provided in table 2.1.
Table 2.1: IPv6 text representation
Form Example
IPv6 address 2012:abcd:1234:4321:0000:0000:0000:0001
IPv6 Short-form 2012:abcd:1234:4321::1
Prefix Notation 2012:abcd:1234:4321::1/64
Notice that a single IPv6 address assignment, with at least 64 bits as prefix,
has more host possibilities than the entire IPv4 address space. Its prefix
information1 is used to group IPv6 address types as show in table 2.2. An
IPv6 address type can represent a group of addresses or a single address.
For example the loopback type represents a single address, the loopback
address ::1.
Table 2.2: IPv6 addressed types based on the prefix, adapted from [1]
Notation
Address type Binary Prefix
Unspecified 00...0 (128 bits) ::/128
Loopback 00...1 (128 bits) ::1/128
Multicast 11111111 FF00::/8
Link-Local Unicast 1111111010 FE80::/10
Global Unicast others
1The prefix information are the left-most n bits of the IPv6 address, where n is the
prefix length.
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Address scope
An address scope defines the span where the address can identify uniquely
an interface [4]. The scope zone represents the area of a group of nodes
using the same address scope [4]. The following list explains the unicast
address scopes. Those concepts are important to understand each IPv6 type.
Multicast address scopes are out of scope of this thesis.
Interface-local The span of the packets is limited to the same node/in-
terface of the origin (e.g. communications between processes using
a socket with the same IP address).
Link-local Equivalent to IPv4 broadcast domains, packets using these
addresses are not forwarded by routers. Nevertheless, they can
be used to create a fully functional network within that scope.
Global The most wide scope used to identify an interface over several
networks (e.g. Internet).
Unicast
In IPv6, different addresses sub-types of unicast were introduced as charac-
terized below.
Link-local It is composed of the well-known prefix, FE80::/10 plus a
64 bits interface ID in the 64 right-most bits. The remaining bits
of the prefix are filled with zeros.
The interface ID identifies a specific network card inside a network,
this means that an interface ID is unique per network prefix. Al-
though it is possible that the same interface ID identifies different
network cards in different networks, this is not likely, since in most
cases this value is generated randomly, or based on a constant
link-layer address.
The IPv6 link-local addresses can only be used with on the same a
link. These addresses have an important role in several protocols
such as Neighbor Discovery (ND). Before being generated, the
global address, are used to exchange messages between nodes on
8
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the same link. They can also be used to deploy an internal and
non routable network.
Global It is a routable address built locally, in the node, using an ISP
assigned prefix plus the Interface ID. Those addresses are globally
unique and therefore, used for internetwork communication (e.g.
between two or more IPv6 networks). Each interface can have
more than one global address.
Site-local A routable address type restricted to an organization network
scope, already deprecated [5].
Multicast
IPv6 multicast addresses are used in one-to-many communication playing an
important role in several IP related protocols as a replacement of broadcast.
Table 2.3 illustrates some of the most used and pre-defined multicast addresses.
If multicast needs to be supported by a v4-to-v6 converter box, like mShield,
this device should be aware of pre-defined multicast groups and the incom-
patibilities with the previous IP version.
Table 2.3: Most common and pre-defined IPv6 addresses
IPv6 Address Description
FF02::1 All Nodes address (link-local scope)
FF02::2 All Routers address (link-local scope)
FF01::1 All Nodes Address (interface-local scope)
FF01::2 All Routers Address (interface-local scope)
2.1.3 Header Format and Extensions
The IPv4 header carries all IP related information and has a variable size,
whereas the IPv6 header has a fixed size and less fields. Figure 2.1 shows
the IPv6 header next to the IPv4 header for easy comparison. In most cases
not all IP options are used, so shifting them to Extension Headers improves
packet processing.
9
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Version Type of Service Total Length
Identification Flags Fragment Offset
Time To Live Protocol Header Checksum
Source Address
Destination Address
Options Padding
IHL
Traffic Class
Source Address
Destination Address
Version Flow Label
Payload Length Next Header Hop Limit
[IPv4]
[IPv6]
Figure 2.1: IPv4 versus IPv6 Header Format
The field Next Header is used to identify the next header, which could be
another extension header or a protocol like, Internet Control Message Protocol
version 6 (ICMPv6). It is possible to have a sequence of different extension
headers, each pointing to the next one. Routers must process the headers in
the same order as they appear [3]. The IPv6 specification defines that IPv6
implementations should have support for Authentication Header (AH) and
Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP) used to provide secure communications
at network layer [3]. Nevertheless, their use is not mandatory.
Both, v4- and v6- headers share the same base fields, an useful feature during
the conversion between them2.
In IPv6, the Quality of Service (QoS) feature can be provided using the field
Traffic Class, similar to the field Type of Service in IPv4 [7]. Additionally, in
IPv6 exists the Flow Label field. This field can be used to identify the flow of
packets, corresponding for instance to a VoIP session, which provides a more
efficient routing process. Due the differences between the two IP versions
since this is a new field without correspondence in IPv4, this feature can be
lost (e.g. during a v6- to v4- header conversion [6]).
2The IP/ICMP Translation Algorithm [6] defines how v4- and v6- fields should be
mapped to the other version (e.g. Time To Live in IPv4 to Hop Limit in IPv6)
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An uniform format for the IPv6 extensions header [8], showed in figure
2.2, was defined as an update to the IPv6 specification. According to that
specification, a node can skip the processing of an unknown header.
Hdr Ext LenNext Header
Specific Data
Figure 2.2: IPv6 Extension Header Uniform Format
2.2 Core Protocols
In this section, several protocols like ICMPv6 or Stateless Address Autoconfig-
uration (SLAAC) are presented. They are used to support IPv6 in functions
like neighbor communication or address configuration. Their understanding
is necessary for the security analysis and the design proposal (e.g. how the
ICMPv6 messages can be used to trigger local network attacks).
2.2.1 ICMPv6
The successor to Internet Control Message Protocol version 4 (ICMPv4) is
called ICMPv6 [9]. It defines a new set of control messages for informational
and error purposes. The ICMPv6 header is added immediately after the IPv6
header, as outlined in figure 2.3.
Most of the ICMPv6 messages are derived from ICMPv4, like echo request/re-
ply or time exceed. Nevertheless, new ICMPv6 messages were defined to
cover new functions, like neighbor discovery and stateless autoconfiguration.
It is also possible to define additional messages following a general message
format as described in figure 2.4.
2.2.2 Neighbor Discovery
Neighbor Discovery [10] can be viewed as a mixture between Address Res-
olution Protocol (ARP) and ICMPv4. Technically it defines an additional
set of ICMPv6 messages (e.g. router advertisement / solicitation). Using
11
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Link-layer
Header
IPv6 
Header
ICMPv6
Header
IPv6 Payload
IPv6 Packet
Echo request
Header
or
Echo reply
Header
or
Router solicitation
Header
Figure 2.3: ICMPv6 Header in TCP / IP Architecture
CodeType
Message Body
Checksum
Figure 2.4: ICMPv6 Header Format
those messages, the nodes can interact with each other at the same link. The
following topics describe some of the problems covered by ND:
• ND can be used to discover a list of routers, the network prefix or other
parameters.
• Stateless Address Autoconfiguration allows to configure IPv6 addresses
at network layer.
• Additional functions like Duplicate Address and Neighbor Unreachable
Detection.
The following ICMPv6 messages were defined:
• Router Solicitation / Advertisement They are used to discover a router
and learn IP settings (e.g. network prefix).
• Host Solicitation / Advertisement They are used to discover hosts on
the same link. It is useful for instance to avoid duplicate IPv6 addresses.
Those messages, triggered by the ND algorithms, are sent as replies to nodes,
or sent in an unsolicited way to rapidly propagate changes in the network.
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Usually, in unsolicited messages a reserved multicast address (all-routers or
all-nodes) is used as a destination IP address.
Stateless Auto-configuration
SLAAC [11] is used to generate link-local addresses and global addresses.
The IPv6 addresses are composed of a prefix advertised by the routers and
an interface ID generated based on the link-layer address. SLAAC eliminates
the need of a Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol version 6 (DHCPv6) [12],
also called stateful address autoconfiguration.
Stateless and stateful modes have the same goal, IP settings configuration.
Nevertheless, they are defined at different layers of TCP/IP. Stateless mode
is used at network layer whereas DHCPv6 runs at application layer.
The main disadvantage of the stateful mode is the need of a dedicated
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server. Nevertheless, in a
dual stack environment in order to support dynamic IPv4 and IPv6 address
configuration it is necessary to have a DHCP server, at least for an IPv4
address configuration.
Stateless option is an advantage for a set of devices on the same link since
they can use only link-local addresses to communicate between each other
without the need of a router or even a DHCP server (e.g. a group of sensors
or an ad-hoc network). Nevertheless, the SLAAC definition [11] limits the
parameters advertised by the router and does not cover the use of Domain
Name System (DNS) options3. Additionally, routers do not keep entries of
hosts in the network in stateless mode.
SLAAC begins generating an IPv6 link-local address locally. In the next step
the node sends a message to that IPv6 address and waits for a reply to check
whether that IPv6 address is already used (Duplicate Address Detection
(DAD) ). If successful, the assigned link-local address is used in the next
steps4. A Router Solicitation (RS) message is sent to all-routers multicast
IPv6 address and a Router Advertisement (RA) message containing the prefix
information is expected. Finally, the host can use the network prefix together
3IPv6 router advertisement options [13] can be used to configure DNS settings.
4The next steps are just performed by hosts
13
2.3. NAT
with the Interface ID to construct a global and routable IPv6 address.
Generating the interface ID from the Media Access Control (MAC) address
raises security concerns since the value is predictable allowing host scanning in
a remote network. The first 24 bits of Interface ID identifies the network card
vendor that could be guessable and the next 16 bits are fixed reducing the
scanning space to 24 bits [14]. Since the interface ID remains constant, this
allows also for host-tracking in different networks. One possible solution is
the use of SLAAC privacy extensions [15], generating temporary and random
values for the Interface ID. However using temporary values makes it hard to
manage IP assignments within a network. A proposal solution [16] defines
a way of random generating the Interface ID value based on several inputs,
including a private key and network prefix. In this approach the value remains
constant within a network since all inputs remain constant, making it easy to
manage and, at the same time, difficult to scan since it is randomly generated
having a private as input.
SEND
A proposed standard, SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) [17] defines a
secure ND against attacks that include Denial of Service (DoS) and address
spoofing [18]. The proposed solution involves:
• Certification Paths, a mechanism to establish trusted anchors to the
authority of a router.
• Cryptographically Generated addresses (CGAs) [19] using a public-key
scheme.
• Signature option in ND messages to guarantee the integrity and au-
thenticity of the messages.
2.3 NAT
One of the proposed solutions in IPv4 to minimize the limitation of the amount
of available addresses is called Network Address Translation (NAT) [20]. This
technique is used to translate the source IP address of a packet. Commonly,
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it uses an association of a private IP address and a port mapped to a global
IP address, so multiple internal IP addresses can be translated to one single
external IP address. Other terms such as NAT44 or NAPT44 are often used
to describe the same technique.
In IPv6 the availability of free addresses is not a problem anymore. Never-
theless, several other reasons, such as hiding internal devices in a network or
renumbering purposes, can justify the use of NAT with IPv6. NAT breaks
the end-to-end connectivity model and, without additional strategies, it will
break several protocols. A discussion about the use of NAT in the design is
presented in chapter 4. The security implications are discussed in chapter 3.
An experimental NAT66 document [21] defines a stateless mechanism to
translate between IPv6 prefixes. There are no more RFCs referring to NAT
in IPv6. Even that document does not define how to translate from multiple
IPv6 addresses to a single IPv6 address.
Nevertheless, several implementations already support stateful NAT in IPv6
in the same way as used in IPv4, see appendix B. In the remainder of the
document, the terms NAT44 and NAT66 are used to refer to a stateful NAT
in IPv4 and IPv6 respectively. The use of NAT in transition scenarios is
described in the following sections.
2.4 Transition Mechanisms
The term Transition adopted in IETF documents refers to the mechanisms
used to migrate from IPv4 to IPv6. Although another term could be used,
Coexistence, since those mechanisms describe scenarios of coexistence between
the two IP versions, it is commonly accepted that Transition better describes
the goal of those mechanisms [22]. On the other hand, the term Coexistence
is associated with dual stack technique. The term Conversion refers to the
translation technique used to convert between two IP versions.
2.4.1 Mechanisms
Generally, the transition mechanisms are grouped into three categories: dual-
stack, tunneling and translation. In the following subsections, an overview of
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each one is presented.
Dual Stack
Dual stack means full support for both IP architectures, IPv4 and IPv6 in
the same host. This is the recommended approach for most scenarios [23].
However, this is not always possible (e.g. on legacy devices).
Tunneling
This technique refers to the encapsulation of IPv6 packets inside IPv4 packets.
A tunnel between two end-points is established where an IPv4 header is
added and extracted. The intermediate devices between the end-points of
the tunnel do not need to know IPv6. One example of this implementation is
Teredo [24].
Translation
Translation means convert IP packets to the other IP version. This translation
occurs in IP and Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) headers, as well
as in the transport header in some modes as described in the next topics. It
allows IPv4-only devices to communicate with IPv6-only devices.
2.4.2 Translators in detail
A dual stack approach implies changes in all devices to use both IP versions,
and that change could not be desirable (e.g. legacy medical devices). The
tunnels approach does not solve the problem of enabling communication
between two IP versions since it is used to enable communication between end
nodes using the same IP version. Others solutions like A+P [25], NAT444 [26]
or DS-Lite [27] aim to solve the problem of scarcity of IPv4 addresses. However,
they do not enable the communication between both versions. In this thesis,
the only approach considered regards translators.
One of the first attempts by IETF to standardize the translation process is
Stateless IP/ICMP Translation Algorithm (SIIT) [28] and NAT-PT [29]. In
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SIIT, a stateless mode of translating IP and ICMP headers is defined, whereas
NAT-PT defines the routing process between both IP versions. Nevertheless,
due to technical reasons [30], NAT-PT was obsoleted and the SIIT algorithm
was updated by a new IP/ICMP translation algorithm [6] as part of a new
translation framework, NAT64 [22].
A stateless translation approach called IVI Translation [31] deployed in China
Education and Research Network (CERNET) is presented as an informational
RFC. In this approach, the SIIT algorithm is used with a limited subset of
IPv6 addresses and with a fixed prefix. Those constraints allow the support
of one-to-one address translation in both directions providing scalability. The
differences between stateless and stateful modes can be found in the next
topics and appendix A.
To the best of author’s knowledge, no other relevant studies refer to practical
deployments of the translation approach and the use of NAT64 framework
either using the stateless or stateful mode. Nevertheless, some recent studies
provide feasibility analyses referring to the behavior of the translators with the
most common upper-layers protocols [32] [33]. No other studies were found
mentioning security implications resulting from a practical deployment of
NAT64. Nevertheless, several documents can be found mentioning theoretical
security considerations regarding the transition mechanisms. These security
considerations are covered by chapter 3. Looking at recent implementations,
it is also expected that in the near future new studies will appear mentioning
analysis vectors like security or performance.
NAT64 Framework
The NAT64 framework [22] includes the following components:
• IPv6 / IPv4 Address translation [34]
• IP and ICMP translation [6]
• Support for stateful mode [35]
• Support for DNS64 [36]
• Application Layer Gateway (ALG), additional definitions to support
incompatible protocols due to its constrains (e.g. ftp active mode)
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IPv6 / IPv4 Addressing Translation
A proposed standard [34] defines an algorithm to automatically compute an
IPv6 address from an IPv4 address plus a well-defined prefix5 (or a manually
defined one). The same definition also specifies the reverse algorithm to
extract the IPv4 from an IPv6 address.
According to the terminology in the specification:
IPv4-translated IPv6 addresses Subset of IPv6 addresses used by
IPv6 nodes that can be automatically translated to IPv4, used in
stateless translation.
IPv4-converted IPv6 addresses IPv6 addresses representing the IPv4
addresses from IPv6 network perspective.
The IPv4 embedded IPv6 addresses (IPv4-converted IPv6 addresses and
IPv4-translated IPv6 addresses) described in figure 2.5 contain the following
elements:
Prefix Well-known prefix or statically assigned. The definition restricts
the prefix length to 32, 40, 48, 56, 64 or 96 bits. The well-known
prefix cannot be used with private IPv4 addresses.
Null Octet A null octet for prefixes smaller than 96 bits is included
between bits 64 and 71. It is represented in the figure 2.5 by the
letter u.
Suffix An all-zero suffix at the end till bit 128.
PL
32
40
48
56
96
64
6432 96
u
u
u
u
u
suffix
suffix
suffix
suffix
suffix
prefix
prefix
prefix
prefix
prefix
prefix
v4 (32)
v4 (24)
v4 (16)
(8)
v4 (32)
v4 (24)
(16)
(8)
v4 (32)
Figure 2.5: IPv4 embedded in IPv6 addresses format
5The well-known prefix used by the mapping algorithm is 64:ff9b::/96
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IP/ICMP Translation
IP / ICMP Translation Algorithm [6] defines how a specific IP or ICMP header
can be translated to the other version. The document specifies the fields
correspondence and defines what should be done in case of incompatibilities.
New IPv6 features are discarded during the translation (e.g. Flow Label field).
The IP addresses are translated using address translation algorithm [34].
Some of the ICMP message types do not have correspondence in the other
version. For instance, information request/reply messages in IPv4 are obso-
leted in IPv6 and should be dropped out during the translation process. For
those ICMP messages having correspondence in the other version, the fields
are updated [6].
The IP/ICMP translation algorithm also specifies that the converter device
should be capable of distinguishing when a packet should be translated or
not. This is important and makes it possible to have both IP versions at the
same side of the translator device which only performs the translation when
needed.
Operation Modes
The major problem of NAT64 is how to represent any IPv6 address with a
single IPv4, due to the difference in their lengths. This problem is visible in
IPv4-initiated connections where an unknown IPv6 needs to be represented
by an IPv4 address. In IPv6-initiated connections, the problem can easily be
solved by representing each IPv4 address by its own value plus some prefix or
using another appropriate scheme. Nevertheless, this process consumes one
IPv4 address per each IPv6 and it is not suitable to solve the lack of IPv4
addresses.
The framework also defines two modes of operation:
Stateless The same algorithm is used to translate the source and des-
tination IP addresses in both directions (IPv6 to IPv4 and vice
versa). The stateless mode is limited to IPv4-translatable IPv6
addresses. In the stateless mode, the change only occurs in the IP
header and it is not expected to interfere with the upper layers.
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Stateful A state table is maintained and used to translate the desti-
nation IP address. The state mantains the relation between the
destination IP address and port to the translated IP address and
port. After the translation, the packet is sent with the source IP
address of the converter interface (i.e. IPv6 or IPv4 depending
on the direction).
The stateful mode allows the use of any IPv6 address without
any manual configuration, but also cannot solve the problem of
IPv4-initiated connections. Nevertheless, in this approach each
address translation can be manually specified. Restricting the
IPv6 address space to a subset of IPv4-translatable IPv6 addresses
simplifies the configuration since it can be based just on a prefix.
In this mode, the transport header is modified, for instance by
changing the source address port. Other upper-layer protocols
that include IP addresses in their own headers such DNS, need
additional considerations and the use of an ALG. Moreover, the
current specification [35] only supports ICMP, Transmission Con-
trol Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP).
The Appendix A presents an overview of the translation steps (with emphasis
on addressing) and compares stateless and stateful modes.
DNS64
One of the functions of DNS is a mapping between IP addresses and domain
names using DNS records. The A records map an IPv4 address to a domain
name whereas the AAAA records are used to map an IPv6 address to a
domain name. DNS64 [36] permits the translation between an A record to
an AAAA record.
Whenever an IPv6-only device needs an AAAA record, it sends a DNS request
to the DNS64 device, that can be implemented or not in the same device of
the NAT64 translator. If the DNS64 device does not know the AAAA record
requested, it makes a new request to a DNS server for an A record using
the same domain requested. If the DNS64 gets the answer, it synthesizes
an AAAA record using the IPv4 address mapped in the A record plus a
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configured prefix and forwards it to the IPv6- only device.
In theory DNS46 should perform the reverse process, by synthesizing the
A records from AAAA records and returning the A records to IPv4 hosts.
Currently, no valid drafts exist covering this process.
2.5 Security Theory
In this section, security concepts like malicious code or DoS attacks are
explained. Those concepts are refered in the security analysis. Therefore,
their understanding is necessary (e.g. the impact of a DoS attack in the
network communication).
2.5.1 Security properties
The STRIDE model [37], used in security analysis, defines a threat classifi-
cation (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial
of Service, Elevation of Privilege) according to the effect on the following
security properties:
Authentication Provide evidence of identity. Consists of a method
where the identity is compared against some known and trusted
values.
Integrity The term is often related with ensuring that specific data
is not manipulated during a transfer. It can also mean that a
system is free of malicious code.
Non-repudiation Guarantees that an action cannot be denied later
by its actor.
Confidentiality Ensures that the information remains private. This
means the use of cryptography to encrypt the data.
Availability Refers to whether a resource can be accessed. A resource
can be a service running on a device or the entire network.
Authorization Narrows the access to a resource based on privileges.
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2.5.2 Malicious code
Malicious code defines the group of all types of programs coded to cause
damage on a system or device. The term compromised is used to define a
device that contains any type of malicious code. There are several types of
malicious code such as virus, worms or trojans. Despite of their individual
definitions, not covered by this thesis, they share some common properties:
• Reproduce itself via network by exploiting vulnerabilities or by human
intervention
• Destroy, tamper or steal data by sending it to a remote machine
• Used to trigger attacks (e.g. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attacks)
Figure 2.6 gives a generic overview of the steps needed to compromise a
system over a network and steal confidential informations using a worm. A
typical scenario involves the following steps:
Reconnaissance A pre-defined range or a random number of IP ad-
dresses is used to discover potential victims. Several discovery
techniques are applied to gather information like open ports and
information about the services behind these ports. This helps to
find potential targets that have vulnerabilities.
Exploiting a vulnerability The next step is to explore the vulnera-
bility. The target can be any service reachable by network or even
the protocol used during the communications, like IPv6. Figure
2.6 shows a simplified buffer overflow, where an arbitrary code
can be executed as a result of lack of input validation.
Remote code Execution During this step, generally two actions are
implemented. Repeat the cycle so another device can be compro-
mised and, optionally, send any kind of data back to the original
attacker. Other arbitrary actions are also possible.
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Figure 2.6: Steps of a buffer overflow attack
2.5.3 Spoofing
IP Spoofing
The basic function of IP spoofing is to manipulate a packet header in order to
change the IP source address, either IPv4 or IPv6. By applying this technique,
an attacker can send a request from his machine to an intermediate device
and expect that a reply will be sent to the victim machine, turning the
intermediary into a reflector. This technique can be used in DoS attacks as
described in the next topics. Another common usage is to bypass a firewall
that implements filtering based on a source IP address.
Neighbor Spoofing
For unicast communications, whenever a host needs to sent a packet to
another host, besides the IP values it also needs to know the MAC address
to send the packet. In IPv4, the mapping of MAC to IP is usually done
dynamically using ARP. In IPv6, ARP is not used anymore but the need of
mapping IPv6 to MAC addresses remains. That function is performed using
Neighbor Solicitation (NS) and Neighbor Advertisement (NA). An attacker
can send unsolicited NA messages claiming a spoofed IP address causing the
wrong association between the IP and MAC address on the victim.
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2.5.4 DoS
The term DoS is associated with a class of attacks aiming at the availability
of a service, a host or an entire network by consuming the available resources.
An elevated number of packets per second may cause a network congestion
or memory exhaustion and prevent others services of using those resources.
Although these types of attacks do not cause a direct damage on systems,
they have a strong impact on companies, since presently a significant number
of resources are network dependent. In chapter 3, the impact of those attacks
on mShield and its environment is discussed.
There are two classes of DoS: massive packet flooding or special forged packets
in order to explore protocol issues or poor implementations. In the case of
massive flooding attacks, one of the key aspects is the factor of amplification.
A remote controlled structure of compromised devices, zombies, or a group of
trusted servers, reflectors, are often used in order to amplify the attack. The
reflectors are regular servers that reply to requests from a forged source IP
address. This way, the replies are sent to the victims instead of the real source
of the request. Different terms are applied according to the use of distributed
compromised devices, DDoS, the used of reflective hosts, Reflective Denial of
Service (RDoS), or combining both, Distributed Reflective Denial of Service
(DRDoS) as outlined in figure 2.7. The compromised devices can also be
organized in a multi-layer structure in order to amplify the attack factor and
difficult the traceability of the attacker. The attacks may explore one or more
protocols such as ICMP, TCP or UDP.
attacker
zombie(s)
victim
reflective 
host(s)
DoS DDoS RDoS DRDoS
Figure 2.7: Behavior of different types of DoS attacks
DoS attacks rely on the use of forged source IPs, taking advantage of incorrect
24
2.5. SECURITY THEORY
filtering, and a prior spread of malicious code to create a "network" of
compromised devices. An example of these attacks is shown in figure 2.8.
attacker
zombie(s)
victim
reflective 
host(s)
tcp-syn (3x6)
commands (x3)
tcp-syn-ack (18)
Figure 2.8: DRDoS attack using invalid TCP connections
2.5.5 Packet Filtering
Ingress filtering One of the security mechanisms against IP spoofing
based DoS attacks is ingress filtering [38]. As a current best
practice all packets coming from an unallocated space or any
specially reserved IP should be blocked. Those IP addresses are
usually called bogons6.
Egress filtering The egress filtering mechanism is used to filter spoofed
packets from the inside.
These filtering techniques are specially useful if applied by an Internet Service
Provider (ISP) in order to prevent DDoS attacks. However, since some ISP
do not provide those types of filtering some of the techniques employed in
those attacks are still valid.
6Team Cymru provides an updated list of bogons IP addresses including IPv6 [39]
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3.1 Methodology
The methodology used includes a set of steps as outlined in figure 3.1. It
is composed of two parts: a theoretical and a practical part. The security
analysis of making mShield an IPv4 to IPv6 converter box is provided in
the theoretical part, whereas in the practical part, a design proposal and its
implementation is presented. Additionally, it also includes a set of practical
tests and a discussion of their results. The current mShield design does not
have any IPv6 related support. Therefore, it is useful to understand how
mShield can be redesigned to enable IPv6 support.
In the proposed design, all the design changes from current design are
discussed. The practical tests support the theoretical security discussion and
the proposed design. The terminology and a detailed description of each step
are provided in the next topics.
Modeling the Environment
Identify the threats
Identify the assets
[Theoretical] [Practical]
Risk Assessment
Security Discussion Proposed Design
Implementation
Practical Tests
Figure 3.1: Steps of the Methodology
3.1.1 Terminology
Asset An asset represents a process, data or physical resource that
belongs to the information system.
Threat A threat can be defined as the damage that an action can
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cause to assets. The damage results from an action of someone or
something in the presence of a vulnerability. Even if a vulnerability
is fixed, the threat persists and can be triggered in the presence
of other vulnerability.
Vulnerability Vulnerability refers to a specific known weakness of a
system. Can be referred to hardware or software weaknesses. The
scope of this document is related to software.
Risk Risk is commonly expressed as the value of several inputs like the
impact of a specific threat combined with the likelihood.
3.1.2 Modeling the Environment
This step involves gathering information about mShield, costumer network
and Philips medical devices in order to understand the system. The main
characteristics and requirements of those elements are described in section
3.2. A full description of the translation process and implementation details
is presented in appendix B.
3.1.3 Identify the assets
At this step, a discussion about each asset is presented. The resulting list of
assets will be used to match against the threats. Each asset is expressed in
together with its importance, expressed by the terms high, medium or low.
The definitions used to evaluate each asset are shown in table 3.1 whereas
the assets are discussed in section 3.
Table 3.1: Assets Definition
Classification Definition
High It is mandatory to protect the asset.
Medium It is not mandatory but the asset should be pro-
tected.
Low It is not mandatory but it could be desirable to
protect the asset.
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3.1.4 Identify the threats
In this step a list of network threats are discussed. Each threat is grouped
according the STRIDE model [37]: Spoofing identity, Tampering with data,
Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege.
The threats discussion is presented in section 3.
3.1.5 Security Discussion
In this step, a security analysis about the differences of both IP versions is
provided. It includes a discussion about the needed changes to the design
such the translation approach or the security implications of the IP address
allocation method. The security discussion is presented in section 3.
3.1.6 Risk Assessment
In this step, a risk evaluation based on Risk Management Guides for Informa-
tion technology Systems [40] is performed. It is important not only discuss
the effects but also measure them. The risk assessment allows to quantify the
risk associated with each threat and helps to decide the next steps (accept
the risk or mitigate it). Two inputs are used in the risk evaluation: impact
and likelihood [40].
The impact measures the consequences of a materialized threat whereas the
likelihood measures the probability of the threat being realized, considering the
existence of known vulnerabilities, design flaws or the complexity / expertise
required. The impact discussion and the risk assessment is provided in section
3.
3.1.7 Proposal Design
In this step, a new mShield design is presented in chapter 4. All changes
are discussed and explained including the role of mShield in the translation
process. Those changes are based on the security analysis.
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3.1.8 Implementation
In this step, the implementation of all design changes is provided. It contains
all the steps, commands and scripts used to enable NAT64 translation on
mShield. The implementation details are covered by the chapter 4. Never-
theless, its details are presented in appendix B.
3.1.9 Practical tests
Several types of tests are part of this step. They are intended to support
the proposed design and the theoretical security discussion. The converter
box requirements are tested and the packet translation debugged. Finally,
a discussion about their results is provided. The practical tests and their
discussion are presented in the chapter 4.
3.2 Environment
An IPv4 to IPv6 converter box represents a network device capable of
translating communications initiated by IPv4 devices towards IPv6 devices.
The basic requirement includes support for unicast and IP / ICMP packets
translation. Additionally, IPv6 to IPv4 translation must be also supported.
The mShield device plays the role of a converter box.
In this section, the entire environment surrounding mShield is described. It
includes the medical devices and customer networks as well as the charac-
teristics of the environment. Finally, the role of mShield in the translation
process is also described.
All the scenarios involving IPv4 legacy devices and the need of translation
between IP versions were considered as outlined in figures 3.2 to 3.5. All
options are important to consider since they affect the security analysis. For
example in figure 3.2, the only one with just one IP architecture in both sides,
the threats of IPv6 extensions headers are not considered since they are not
translated by IP / ICMP translation algorithm [6].
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Philips Scope
mShield
IPv4IPv6
Figure 3.2: IPv6 Costumer Network and IPv4 Medical Devices
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mShield
IPv4
IPv6
IPv6
Figure 3.3: IPv6 Costumer Network and IPv4/IPv6 Medical Devices
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Figure 3.4: IPv6/IPv4 Costumer Network and IPv4 Medical Devices
Philips Scope
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Figure 3.5: IPv6/IPv4 Costumer Network and IPv4/IPv6 Medical Devices
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Features
• The converter box should support communications in both directions.
It includes incoming connections, initiated by customers devices, and
outgoing connections, initiated by medical devices.
• The converter box should be able to translate IP / ICMP headers in
unicast communications.
• Generic application layer protocols using TCP or UDP at the transport
layer should be supported.
Constraints
• IPv4 legacy devices should be supported without the need of adapting
the devices already developed.
• The new design should not impose any constraints in customers net-
works. Those networks are not managed by Philips. Therefore, it
should be possible to use any IP address in the customer side.
3.2.1 Elements
Medical Devices
Those devices represent the group of all medical devices deployed by Philips.
The protocols used, run at the top of TCP or UDP (e.g. HyperText Trans-
fer Protocol (HTTP) or Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine
(DICOM)). IPsec or multicast communications are not used. Therefore, it is
not necessary the use of any ALG. Currently, medical devices uses only IPv4.
Nevertheless, it is expected that new devices already support IPv6.
Customer Network
Since those networks are not managed by Philips, they should be considered
as insecure. Nevertheless, in the most of the cases they have a perimeter
device to filter traffic from the Internet. That consideration is necessary to
the security analysis. Customer networks can be IPv4, IPv6 or both. The
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external interface of mShield, part of customer network, can be statically or
dynamically assigned (e.g. using SLAAC). The security implications of using
a dynamic assignment are discussed in section 3.
mShield
The mShield device represents the intermediate device in all communications
between the customer and the medical devices network. Its first goal should
be to ensure the security of the medical devices network. The security should
be enforced before the efficiency. The conversion function is a requirement
caused by the existence of legacy devices. Nevertheless, in the future, the
communications are expected to be IPv6 to IPv6. Those concepts are
important during the design and implementation of a new mShield release as
a converter box.
In terms of software, mShield is a minimal modified version of OpenBSD.
That choice can be justified with the main goal of security in mind. It is based
on one of the most secure Operating System (OS) in the market. As a bonus,
its reduced size make it an easily manageable software. The configuration
can be done using a remote Secure Shell (SSH) connection or using serial
connection via a configuration tool.
mShield is composed of 4 physical interfaces, one external interface connected
to the costumer network, and the other internal interfaces, connected to
medical devices. Additional functions such as IP translation or cryptographic
operations could exceed the limited hardware capacity of mShield. Therefore,
the hardware requirements should be reconsidered for the new design.
3.3 Security Discussion
In this section, a security analysis of the environment and its needed changes
are presented. It is composed of the assets and threats identification, a
discussion about their impact and a risk assessment. It is useful for the next
phase in order to improve the security of the new mShield design.
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3.3.1 Assets
In this subsection, the security related assets are identified and discussed.
Their importance and the role of mShield are necessary in order to understand
what kind of threats surround the environment. A detailed discussion about
the threats and their impact is provided in the next sections and the identified
assets are shown in table 3.2.
Availability
Medical devices like x-ray systems are used in a critical environment. Those
devices can be used to save lives, and therefore it is necessary to assure its
availability. By filtering the traffic from the outside mShield should assure
that they can still be used in case of network availability attacks (e.g. DoS
attack from the outside).
Due to the actual design, all communications are via mShield exposing it as
a single disruption point. Nevertheless, during network unavailability, it is
always possible to physically access and use a medical device.
On the other hand, a successful attack against medical devices availability
will cause a serious impact. Protecting the systems availability is therefore
classified as of high importance. It is acceptable that mShield becomes
unavailable but that is not acceptable for a medical device.
Integrity
The patient data, used by medical devices, is critical and should not be
tampered or destroyed by malicious code.
The mShield role is limited to the traffic filtering, which means it cannot
detect malicious code, like an anti-virus software. Nevertheless, through
traffic filtering, mShield can reduce the propagation and effect of malicious
code.
The loss of integrity has also an effect on the systems availability. For instance,
a virus detection will likely cause a downtime for a device or the entire medical
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devices network. Since it is important to assure the systems availability it is
also necessary to assure their integrity.
Table 3.2: Assets evaluation and description
ID Security
Property
Asset Importance
1 Availability Ensure availability of the systems by pro-
tecting the network against attacks.
High
2 Integrity Reduce the effect and propagation of mali-
cious code over the network
Medium
Further Considerations
Additional considerations are important to understand the scope of this
analysis and the security evaluation. Nevertheless, they are not covered by
the threats and risk discussion since they are not related with the converter
box, IPv6 or part of current features of mShield.
Traffic filtering is based on IP addresses and ports, there is no traffic au-
thentication. Notice that the purpose of an IP address is identify a network
card and not provide evidence. As a consequence, mShield is vulnerable to
spoofing attacks either in IPv4 or IPv6.
Traffic encryption, providing end-to-end confidentiality, is done using upper
layer protocols such as SSH or HyperText Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS).
Authentication and authorization are also a security concern in the remote
access to mShield (spoofing and elevation of privileges). This access, for
configuration purposes, use SSH protocol, and again, it is not related with
converter role.
For the same reasons end-to-end data integrity and non-repudiation were also
not considered.
3.3.2 Threats
In this subsection, the threats surrounding the environment are identified. It
is also explained their meaning and why they are a threat. The identified
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threats are shown in table 3.3.
DoS
Two threats against the environment were considered: DoS attacks against
mShield itself and DoS attacks against medical devices. The scenarios
where an attack can affect medical devices but not mShield or the network
communication are described in the next topics.
In both cases, the source of DoS attacks can be a device in the Internet or a
compromised device in the customer network.
Those attacks are considered as threats since they affect the network avail-
ability or, in the worst case, affect the availability of a medical device.
Tampering
In this category tree types of threats were considered: Malicious code affecting
either medical devices or mShield and its propagation over network.
For the network propagation scenario, the communications between customer
and medical devices as well as communications between medical devices via
mShield were studied. Although, medical devices are considered trusted
devices, they can get compromised and spread malicious code over network.
Malicious code affecting medical devices can be used to tamper, steal or
destroy patient data. Whereas malicious code affecting mShield can be used
to change firewall configurations or intercept and steal patient data.
A compromised device, either a medical device or mShield can also be used
to trigger other network attacks (e.g. DoS attacks).
3.3.3 Security Considerations
In this section, the security implications of the design are discussed. The use
of IPv6 and the options for the new design are discussed. They are necessary
to understand the impact and the likelihood of each threat presented during
the risk assessment.
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Table 3.3: Threats evaluation and description
ID Category Threat
1 DoS DoS attacks against mShield
2 DoS DoS attacks against medical devices
3 Tampering Network propagation of malicious code
4 Tampering Malicious code affecting medical devices
5 Tampering Malicious code affecting mShield
Translation approach
The translation aproach, such as NAT64, does not raise additional security
considerations rather than use the IPv6 and IPv4. Nevertheless, all headers
and IP address translations need to be computed and therefore, can be used
as a DoS target. Other security issues may result from the implementation
used.
Address Assignment
The IPv6 address allocation method can increase the likelihood of network
attacks. Dynamic assignment methods, such as SLAAC or DHCPv6, generally,
produce more predictable addresses (e.g. MAC based or sequential ranges) [41].
Although, it is not expected that mShield is connected to the Internet
without any filtering allowing remote scans. Nevertheless, even considering
random IPv6 addresses, the local scanning is possible as discussed in the next
subsections.
Routing and Switching
In the current design, the packet filtering is based on IP addresses and ports,
mShield operates on data-link layer such as a switch. That means mShield is
not visible in the network scans. Nevertheless, the IP / ICMP translation
and packet forwarding, required for the new design, are done at the network
layer. In that case, it may be desirable that mShield operate at the network
layer, such as a router. The discussion about functional advantages and
disadvantages are presented in chapter 4.
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A router firewall means that it has assigned IP addresses on its interfaces
and therefore it is also a target for network based attacks. In that case, the
those attacks can be done not only against medical devices but also against
mShield.
Using a router approach, from the outside perspective, medical devices are
not visible. They are hidden behind external interface of mShield. Using
Packet Filter (PF) it is possible to employ the same filtering policy.
On the other hand, medical devices are connected to internal mShield in-
terfaces. In that case, mShield should behave as a switch, grouping those
devices in a single network.
Communications between medical devices can occur without mShield filtering
(e.g. external switch). In the case of internal communications using different
IP versions, an external switch, without IP conversion is useless For the cases
of a compromised medical devices, filtering internal connections can also
prevent malicious code propagation via network.
Reconnaissance
Dual stack, specially in the external interface, increases the attack surface.
Although, the necessary support for both IP versions in the customer side
increases the number of effective malicious code and scanning methods.
Excepting the common malicious code, the system is exposed to IPv4 plus
the IPv6 threats. Several methods and tools have already been developed for
perform IPv6 scans [42] [43] [44].
NAT in the communications between medical and customer devices difficults
automated processes used by virus and worms to detect vulnerabilities and
the OS fingerprint of medical systems. The same result can be achieved in
the current design using traffic normalization.
In IPv6, even that the remote host scan can be difficult by using random
IPv6 addresses, the local scan is simplified by the use of pre-defined multicast
groups (e.g. ping to multicast link-local address of all nodes).
The services running on medical devices can be found by scanning all network
range and ports either using a router or a switch approach. Using mShield as
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a NAT router, the result is one host, the external interface of mShield, with
all used open ports whereas in the current design the open ports are spread
by several hosts. It is possible to find services either in IPv4 or IPv6.
On the other hand, the random network scans performed by virus or worms
can be easily flagged since all communications are controlled and expected.
This feature is not present in the current design. Several approaches have
been developed to detect those scans in IPv6 [45] [46].
Vulnerabilities
Nevertheless, after a successful services recognition it is also necessary to
have some vulnerability to explore. One of them, refers to the use of Routing
Headers since this could be used to perform DoS attacks or bandwidth theft,
particularly the type 0, already deprecated [47].
Other topics already observed in IPv4 like fragmented packet handling or
stateful mechanisms are susceptible to cause DoS or used to bypass packet
filtering protection. The extension headers mechanisms, used in IPv6, can
also be used to bypass firewall protection (e.g. allow unknown extensions
headers).
Nevertheless, there are no open IPv6 vulnerabilities affecting OpenBSD that
can be used to include some malicious code in the system1.
On the other hand, mShield is still vulnerable to neighbor spoofing and man in
the middle attacks. Several IPv6 design problems were already demonstrated
such neighbor spoofing [42]. ND messages can be spoofed and an attacker
can therefore, intercept connections between mShield and customer devices.
Despite of that, man in the middle attacks are also possible in IPv4 and in
the actual design.
DoS Attacks
The DoS attacks exploring upper layer vulnerabilities are not covered by this
document. Their operation mode does not change and can be easily adapted
1A Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) is an open and widely used vulnera-
bility database. It maintains a list of vulnerabilities and exposures affecting multiple OS
and protocols. [48].
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for IPv6.
In the case of a massive packet flooding from the outside, mShield will become
unresponsive and break the network connection to medical devices. However,
as outlined in figure 3.6, this consideration is not always true. A specific
amount of packets per unit of time lesser than mShield maximum capability
and greater than medical device capability will cause a DoS on medical device.
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Figure 3.6: Effect of different amount of packets/s on the environment
Malicious Code
The mShield role against malicious code is limited to the network commu-
nications. It can block either in the first stage of infection or during the
propagation.
Most of that code are designed to remotely control a devices or sending back
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data from the compromised machines. In both cases, it is expected that
mShield block most of those communications. Other code designed to local
modify or destroy data or spread by removable devices, like usb sticks, are
out of the scope of mShield.
3.3.4 Risk Evaluation
In this subsection, the damage and the likelihood of a threat are evaluated. For
the likelihood values a qualitative analysis based on the current knowledge of
security issues is presented. A discussion about the complexity and expertise
needed to perform the attack is also included in the likelihood discussion. In
the impact analysis, the network and business consequences are presented.
DoS Attacks
Impact A successful DoS attack against a medical device represent high
impact. It have costs for customer and for Philips. The costumer
needs to find or use alternatives such as other available equipment
or transfer patients to another hospital. Whereas Philips needs
to allocate resources to support the costumer to identify and
mitigate the problem.
Nevertheless, a DoS attack against mShield will not have the
same impact, since the medical devices can be physical accessed
and used. It was classified as of low impact.
Likelihood DoS attacks using packet flooding are not complex. They
take the advantage of a distributed network of compromised
devices to flood some victim.
Other DoS attacks using special crafted packets can be more
complex. Nevertheless, for some of them pre-built tools can
be used without too much knowledge. For those attacks it is
necessary to explore an OpenBSD vulnerability.
Despite that, DoS attacks directly against medical devices are only
possible in some cases as described before. Even in those cases,
specific packet rates need to be used. Attacks against mShield
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are considered as more likely since the security level of customer
network is unknown.
On the other hand, in both cases, if the attack comes from the
Internet, the main source of massive flooding attacks, it is also
necessary to bypass a border firewall in the customer side.
For DoS attacks against mShield, it was considered as having
a medium likelihood of happening. Whereas the DoS attacks
against medical devices were evaluated as having a low likelihood.
Malicious Code
Impact The loss of integrity affects the availability of medical devices.
Those devices will likely be considered as unavailable until the
problem is fixed. In those situations, the impact for customer and
for Philips is the same as described above for unavailable devices.
On the other hand, a successful tampering of patient data have
a significant damage for the customer. It can result in lawsuits
against customer.
Considering both scenarios, the impact for damages caused by
malicious code was classified as having a high impact.
Likelihood Due to its OS, malicious code affecting mShield, was evalu-
ated as having a low likelihood. Few of vulnerabilities affected
OpenBSD in the past.
Nevertheless, the case of malicious code affecting medical devices
was classified as having a high likelihood. The sources of infection
are more than network propagation. Considering all those scenar-
ios and the high value, the problem of malicious code detection is
out of the scope of mShield.
It is expected that mShield block most of the malicious code
attempts to spread via network. Nevertheless, the allowed IP and
ports can be used to explore a vulnerability on the victim.
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Table 3.4: Risk classification
ID Threat Damage Likelihood Risk
1 DoS attacks against network 1 2 low
2 DoS attacks against medical devices 3 1 medium
3 Network propagation of malicious
code
3 2 medium
4 Malicious code affecting medical de-
vices
3 3 high
5 Malicious code affecting mShield 3 1 medium
3.3.5 Overview
The main security role of mShield is to protect medical devices against DoS
attacks and malicious code propagation via network.
The use of an additional IP version has an impact in all threats as described
in previous topics either from new IPv6 issues or due to the design changes.
Nevertheless, most of security issues are present in the previous IP version.
Most of the IPv6 specific issues are local and can only affect communication
between mShield and customer devices. That communication cannot be
considered as trusted and should be encrypted whenever patient data is
handled. This is valid either for IPv4 or IPv6.
The current design suffers from security issues such DoS attacks using specific
packet rates). In the proposal design, chapter 4, it is discussed a solution for
those issues.
Chapter 4 also refers to a practical set of tests in order to test behavior of
the proposal design, discover IPv6 vulnerabilities and demonstrate some of
the issues described above.
In the risk assessment, malicious code affecting medical devices was classified
as having the highest risk. Although it has a high impact in the environment,
mShield as a firewall cannot mitigate all the impact. Other measures, such
as the use of an anti-virus, should be enforced in the medical devices. The
current design was also considered effective against DoS attacks either by
reducing its impact or the likelihood.
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4.1 Background
In this chapter, a complete description of mShield641 is presented. It includes
the design discussion and the implementation specification. Several functional
tests and its results are also presented.
4.1.1 mShield
Several customers are moving to IPv6. Therefore, new mShield releases are
required to have IPv6 support. In addition to that, legacy IPv4 medical
devices already developed cannot be discarded or easily updated. Since
those devices are required to talk each other, a IP converter box needs to
translate there messages. Furthermore, the process should not interfere with
the address allocation on customer side. An overview of the problem is
outlined in figure 4.1.
mShield
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To
From
To
From
To
From
To
<IPv4 address>
<IPv4 address>
From
To
From
To
From
To
From
To
<IPv6 address>
<IPv6 address>
IPv6 
Costumer 
Network
IPv4
Medical Device
Network
Figure 4.1: Overview of NAT64 applied to mShield
The current mShield device is a bridge firewall used to protect communications
between medical and customer devices. It connects all the medical and
customer devices in a single network. mShield uses OpenBSD as OS and PF
as packet filtering. There is no need for additional IP configurations since
mShield runs at link layer. Communications between medical devices are not
filtered since it is assumed that are trusted.
1The mShield64 name, used during the thesis development, is composed of the mShield
word plus the 64 number. Similar to NAT64, the 64 number means the IPv6 to IPv4
converter role added in the new design.
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4.1.2 PF and NAT64
PF is the firewall system used in OpenBSD. It can be used to filter packets
based on its values or other additional features like packet translation (e.g.
NAT44) [49]. It is part of the OpenBSD base distribution, which mean it
is maintained by the OpenBSD team, having the same development process
and code quality of the OpenBSD itself.
The first open source implementation of NAT64 Framework [22], stateful
NAT64 [35] and DNS64 [36] started with a project Ecdysis2 [50]. In 2011,
the project was committed to OpenBSD source tree.
In OpenBSD 5.1 release, PF starts to support NAT64 [35]. A new PF rule
option, af-to, allows to specify the IP address translation, either based on
address translation algorithm [34] or statically configured. It is possible to
specify the destination address using an IP address or a network prefix [51].
The af-to option can also be used to filter packets based on IP address or
ports.
PF behaves as stateful translator, this means it keeps a state of each initiated
connection and uses it during the reverse translation (e.g. using the af-
to option it is possible to traslate from IPv4 to IPv6 and then the other
direction). The NAT44 and NAT66 features can be configured using the
nat-to option.
4.2 Proposal Design
In the following sections, the design choices and their discussion are presented.
They describe each needed change of the current design such as routing versus
switching mode or address configuration.
4.2.1 Translation Approach
In addition to the IETF proposed standard, NAT64, it is possible to connect
an IPv4 to IPv6 network using an application layer proxy. Figure 4.2 outline
2The first releases of the Ecdysis project were based on the NAT64 draft specifications.
Nowadays, the specifications are classified as proposed standards.
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their differences. NAT64 works at network and transport layers converting
network and transport headers between two versions. Whereas the application
proxy, such as squid [52], redirect application layer requests / replies. Using
this kind of proxy requires dual stack support and is dependent of the protocols
used. This means, the proxy must know all application layer protocols used in
communications such HTTP or SSH. Whereas NAT64 is designed to support
different types of upper-layers protocols. Nevertheless, if those protocols use
IP literals they are incompatible with NAT64.
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Link Layer
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....
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UDP
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Application Layer
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IPv4/
ICMPv4
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Figure 4.2: Application level Proxy versus NAT64 approach
The stateless translation mode is not considered for the new design. Despite
the fact it offers a flexible and scalable design, the IPv6 addresses are limited to
IPv4-translated IPv6 addresses. That condition is not acceptable since it will
limit the IPv6 range used by the customer. NAT64 integrated with OpenBSD
and PF rules provide a more flexible and robust solution, allowing the support
for generic application layer protocols and an integrated filtering policy.
Therefore, the author proposes the use of a stateful NAT64 approach [36]
supported by PF rules.
4.2.2 Routing and switching
Update mShield to a router will split customer and medical devices in two
separate networks. Although, it is possible to have NAT features in a switch,
conceptually, they belong to the network layer. One of the reasons of using
the switch approach, a mShield installation on-the-fly, without additional
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IP settings such as a gateway or new addresses, is likely to change. It is
necessary to configure the NAT associations either manually or implementing
a dynamic scheme. On the other hand, medical devices need to be connected
using a switch otherwise they will belong to separate networks. At the end,
the author proposes to use a router approach between medical and customer
devices. Whereas a switch approach to connect all medical devices.
4.2.3 Address Configuration
The internal interface of mShield, not visible to the customer, may has always
the same value, a manually configured IP address. Whereas the external
interface are dependent of the customer network. A manually and fixed value
can simplify the management of the translation entries. Using a temporary IP
address will require a dynamic update of PF rules. Nevertheless, the address
assignment method does not interfere with translation scheme. Focusing on
the NAT64 translation, in the remainder of this document, a manually and
fixed values will be considered.
For the new design, the author proposes that all communications are initiatied
to mShield interfaces. Then, mShield is responsible for redirecting the requests
according the mapping entries. From the customer side, there is only one
device to comunicate with, mShield. IP addresses of medical devices are not
visable from the outside.
In addition to NAT64, it is also necessary the use of NAT44 and NAT66,
both supported by PF. All different kinds of communications will behave in
the same way, initiating the comunications to mShield. There is no diference
from the outside of a NAT64 or NAT66 communication, it is started in both
modes to the same IPv6 address. At the end, even that mShield behaves
like a router3, from an outside perspective it behaves as a host providing
several services. Figure 4.3 outline the entire process, including the NAT and
redirect roles. mShield receives the packets from one network segment, and
redirects to the other segment the translated packet. The redirection and
translation processes are performed by PF.
3The translator must behave as router [6].
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Figure 4.3: Packet translation and routing steps
4.2.4 Connection Rate Limits
As described in the security analysis, in some cases, a specific amount of
packets per unit of time can cause a DoS on medical devices and not mShield.
The author propose to limit the traffic rate according to each medical device
capacity. It means a stateful filtering, where the connections are tracked and
limited according pre-configured values. Nevertheless, traffic rate limits will
not protect mShield itself against those attacks.
4.2.5 Configuration Tool
One of the significant changes from the current design is the need of additional
configurations, namely NAT associations. In order to do that, they can be
manually assigned using configuration tool. That tool can be used to create
the address mapping entries by keeping a list of network devices and allowing
a association between them. Then, it should translate those associations into
rules syntax. This way, it provides an abstraction layer between the syntax
of packet filter where an user is able to configure the translation by simply
choosing two devices and a direction to communicate. Additionally features
like backup / restore for the entire configuration are required.
Other approach, using dynamic configuration, involves exchange information
between mShield and the other devices. Several protocols like Universal Plug
and Play (UPnP) or NAT-PMP [53] can be used. It allows hosts to send
messages to the NAT device in order to request an port / NAT association. In
this case, not only mShield should support those protocols but also each device
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who wants to initiate a communication. Moreover, since that scheme allows
devices to control PF rules is not inherently secure. Host authentication is not
part of those protocols. Another one, Port Control Protocol (PCP) [54] and
its authentication mechanism [55], allow host authentication. Nevertheless,
for the best of author knowledge there is no implementation available. For
the sake of complexity, they will not be considered in the remainder of this
document.
4.2.6 Summary
In the next release, the design of mShield should be updated to behave as
a router. The packet filtering plus the address translation occurs between
the external interface and the internal interfaces. The resulting internal
network components used are outlined in figure 4.4 whereas the following
topics summarize the proposed changes.
• Routing between internal and external interfaces and switching role
limited to internal interfaces.
• Support for unicast communications using TCP and UDP for both IP
versions.
• Support for ND and standard ICMPv6 messages [9]. It does not include
SLAAC or other dynamic address configuration mechanism.
• Support for stateful NAT44, NAT66 and NAT64 on both directions.
Mapping entries statically configured.
external
interface
internal 
interfaces
configuration tool
Packet 
Filtering
Address
Translation+
Figure 4.4: Internal mShield behavior
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4.3 Implementation
All configuration description and details are provided in appendix B. Figure
4.5 shows the used scenario whereas the network settings are specified in
table 4.1. It includes both IP versions in each side of mShield. Each possible
communication, in each direction, is numbered in the same figure.
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Network
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Network
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4
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Figure 4.5: Connections between customer and medical devices
Table 4.1: Network Scenario Values
Device Interface IP address Port(s)
hospital device 1 vic0 192.1.1.1/24 80
hospital device 2 vic0 2012::11/64 8080
x-ray device 1 vic0 192.2.2.2/24 90
x-ray device 2 vic0 2011::11/64 9090
mShield vic0 192.1.1.64/24 90, 9090
mShield vic0 2012::64/24 90, 9090
mShield vic1 192.2.2.64/24 80, 8080
mShield vic1 2011::64/64 80, 8080
4.4 Practical Tests
The folowing sections describe pratical scenarios where are tested the current
support of PF for protocols like TCP or UDP as well as some IP related
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features such as Path Maximum Transmission Unit Discovery (PMTUD) or
fragmentation handling.
4.4.1 UDP and ICMP Translation
One of the requirements of mShield is to be able to handle UDP and ICMP.
UDP is used for faster communications without assure reliable. Whereas the
ICMP can be used for network debugging using error or informative messages.
At this point, it is analysed how the converted box behaves and translate
each packet, either UDP or ICMP.
In the first part, a UDP client, listing 4.1, sends to the server 5Mb of random
data previously generated using the dd tool [56]. Whether a UDP server,
listing 4.2, is responsible for creating a UDP socket to receive data. In both
sides, the UDP sockets were managed by Netcat (nc) [57].
ICMP runs at network layer and does not use ports. Therefore, sending
ICMP requests from the outside it is not possible. mShield would not know
to where sent those packets. Nevertheless, according to the requirements,
mShield should be able to translate ICMP messages. The ICMP translation
is only possible using previous states, for instance as a result of a previous
TCP or UDP translation.
In the second part to test ICMP translation, the UDP server socket was
intentionally closed. Whenever the client starts to communicate, the server
should reply with an ICMP unreachable message. Using the previous state,
that message should be then translated by mShield back to the client .
#!/bin/sh
dd if=/dev/random bs=1M count=5 of=random.data
nc -u 192.2.2.64 80 < random.data
Listing 4.1: IPv6/UDP netcat client
#!/bin/sh
nc -ul 2011::11 80 > random.data
Listing 4.2: IPv4/UDP netcat server
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4.4.2 TCP Connections
For testing TCP translation it was established an connection between two
devices and check whether the transmited data was successful translated.
The packets, handled by mShield, are converted between IP versions in both
directions. At the end, the received by the server should be equal to the
trasmmited by the client.
Both client and the server use the nc tool [57] to create the TCP sockets.
The same tool is also used to transfer data between them by redirecting the
input and output of the command. The client, listing 4.3, sends to the server
50Mb of random data previously generated. Additionally, the sha1 tool [58]
is used to create a hash of that data. In the other side, the server, listing 4.4,
receives data and, using the same hashing algorithm of client, also generates
a hash.
The integrity of the received data is evaluated by comparing both hash values.
Whether the packet translation is analysed using tcpdump tool [59] in both
mShield interfaces used.
#!/bin/sh
dd if=/dev/random bs=1M count=5000 of=random.data
sha1 -q random.data > client.hash
nc 192.1.1.64 9090 < random.data
Listing 4.3: IPv4/TCP client using netcat
#!/bin/sh
nc -l 2011:11 9090 -l random.data
sha1 -q random.data > server.hash
Listing 4.4: IPv6/TCP server using netcat
4.4.3 Fragmentation and MTU
Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) defines the maximum size that a packet
can have to be forwarded to another network segment. This value may change
from one segment to another. At the network layer, those differences are
handled using techniques, such as fragmentation or PMTUD. Other techniques
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in the upper layers, such TCP segmentation and the use of Maximum Segment
Size (MSS) field are out of the scope of this thesis since they are not IP
related.
Fragmentation allows to split a bigger packet in several parts for instance
at the middle of the path. Whether PMTUD is used to discover the lowest
MTU along a network path and then, if necessary, fragment the packet at the
origin. In both cases, it becomes necessary for a router or a converter box
such as mShield be able to handle and forward IP fragments. The idea behind
PMTUD is successively probe the path with larger packets until receive the
information that the packet is too big reducing the size the next packets.
In IPv4, PMTUD is optional. The IPv4 header contains a Do not Fragment
(DF) flag, that defines whether a packet can be fragmented along the path
or not, that means enable or not PMTUD [60].
Nevertheless, in IPv6 all fragmentation information was shifted to an extension
header and there is no such flag. Instead, it is used an implicit flag since
the intermediate devices should not fragment packets and it is recommended
to implement PMTUD [61] [3]. In that case, PMTUD is used to find out
the maximum packet size that a packet can have, then the sender should
fragment the packet according to that value.
In the first part of the test, regarding the PMTUD, two tests were performed,
IPv6 to IPv4 and the other direction. A packet bigger than the next-hop
MTU was sent and the reply analysed. In the following tests, in order to have
a consistent and full control about the header fields, all packets were crafted
using scapy tool [62]. For IPv4 packets, in addition to a bigger payload, it
was used the DF IPv4 flag to explicitly enable the PMTUD process. The
scripts used are represented in listings 4.5 and 4.6.
In the second part, instead of sending one single big packet, the original
packet was fragmented before send it. That way it is possible to test whether
the fragments are properly handled and forwarded or not. Listings 4.7 and
4.8, shown IPv4 and IPv6 modes. Communications initiated by customer
devices or the other way behave in the same way. In the scripts and results
are presented communication initiated from the outside.
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#!/usr/local/bin/python
from scapy.all import *
ifo="vic0"
sip, dip="2012::11", "2012::64"
dmac="00:50:56:00:00:cc"
sport, dport=6666, 90
plen=1450
payload="#"*plen
udp=UDP(sport=sport,dport=dport)
ipv6=IPv6(src=sip, dst=dip)
eth=Ether(src=RandMAC(),dst=dmac)
packet=eth/ipv6/udp/payload
sendp(packet,iface=ifo)
Listing 4.5: IPv6/UDP packet using scapy
#!/usr/local/bin/python
from scapy.all import *
ifo="vic0"
sip, dip="192.1.1.1", "192.1.1.64"
dmac="00:50:56:00:00:cc"
sport, dport=6666, 9090
plen=1450
flags=2 # dont fragment set
payload="#"*plen
udp=UDP(sport=6666, dport=dport)
ipv4=IP(src=sip, dst=dip,flags=flags)
eth=Ether(src=RandMAC(),dst=dmac)
packet=eth/ipv4/udp/payload
sendp(packet,iface=ifo)
Listing 4.6: IPv4/UDP packet with DF flag set using scapy
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#!/usr/local/bin/python
from scapy.all import *
ifo="vic0"
sip, dip="192.1.1.1", "192.1.1.64"
dmac="00:50:56:00:00:cc"
sport, dport=6666, 9090
plen=1450
payload="#"*plen
udp=UDP(sport=sport,dport=dport)
ipv4=IP(src=sip, dst=dip)
eth=Ether(src=RandMAC(),dst=dmac)
frags=fragment(eth/ipv4/udp/payload,800)
for f in frags: sendp(f,iface="vic0")
Listing 4.7: IPv4/UDP fragmented packet using scapy
#!/usr/local/bin/python
from scapy.all import *
ifo="vic0"
sip, dip="2012::11", "2012::64"
dmac="00:50:56:00:00:cd"
sport, dport=6666, 90
plen=1450
payload="#"*plen
udp=UDP(sport=sport,dport=dport)
hdrfrag=IPv6ExtHdrFragment()
ipv6=IPv6(src=sip, dst=dip)
eth=Ether(src=RandMAC(),dst=dmac)
frags=fragment6(eth/ipv6/hdrfrag/udp/payload, 800)
for f in frags: sendp(f,iface=ifo)
Listing 4.8: IPv6/UDP fragmented packet using scapy
56
4.5. RESULTS
4.5 Results
The folowing sections show the packets and the results obtained in each
described test. Apendix B contain a description and the entire PF ruleset.
For failed tests it is also described a proposed solution.
4.5.1 UDP and ICMP Translation
Both UDP and ICMP packets were successful translated. In the first part,
with server running, since it is used UDP, there is no reply or acknowledge
message from the server. Nevertheless, the captured packets in mShield,
listing 4.9, reveal the expected translation. The original IPv4 packet to
mShield was translated and forwarded to the other side, from mShield to a
medical device. The source port of the translated address is random chosen
by PF and it is part of the internal state whereas the destination port are
copied from the original packet.
The second part, after the server shutdown, listing 4.10, the expected ICMP
error message was received. An ICMPv6 generated message by the server
was then translated to a ICMPv4 messages back to the client. The PF state
created during the initial UDP request was used to translate back the ICMP
message.
(UDP)
From: 2012::64[:63726]
  To: 2012::11[:80]
medical
device[IPv4] [IPv6]
ext_if int_if
mShield
NAT46
customer
device
(UDP)
From: 192.2.2.2 [:29077]
  To: 192.2.2.64[:80]
Figure 4.6: TODO:
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(UDP)
From: 2012::64[:56232]
  To: 2012::11[:80]
(UDP)
From: 192.2.2.2 [:12857]
  To: 192.2.2.64[:80]
medical
device[IPv4] [IPv6]
NAT46
ext_if int_if
mShieldcustomerdevice
NAT64
(ICMP)
From: 192.2.2.64
  To: 192.2.2.2
(ICMP)
From: 2012::11
  To: 2012::64
Figure 4.7: TODO:
#mshield
$ tcpdump -Nnti vic2
192.2.2.2.29077 > 192.2.2.64.80: udp 1031
$ tcpdump -Nnti vic0
2012::64.63726 > 2012::11.80: udp 1031
Listing 4.9: IPv4 to IPv6 UDP translation packets
#mshield
$ tcpdump -Nnti vic2
192.2.2.2.12857 > 192.2.2.64.80: udp 1031
192.2.2.64 > 192.2.2.2: icmp: 192.2.2.64 udp port 80 unreachable (DF)
$ tcpdump -Nnti vic0
2012::64.56232 > 2012::11.80: udp 1031
2012::11 > 2012::64: icmp6: 2012::11 udp port 80 unreachable
Listing 4.10: UDP translation with returned ICMP error messages
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4.5.2 TCP connection
The TCP connection was successful translated. Listings 4.11 and 4.13 shows
the establishment and finalization of the connection. Whereas the listing 4.12
shows a excerpt of the translated packets and their acknowledgments. The
translations occurred in the same way previous explained for UDP.
Moreover, hash check test confirms the integrity of the data, meaning packets
were successful transmitted. Since there is no fragmentation in any side the
number of received packets was equal to the forwarded my mShield, excluding
ARP and ND messages.
This simulation test not only IPv4 to IPv6 translation but also the other way,
since the IPv6 / TCP acknowledgments need to be translated back. IPv6
initiated connections behave in the same way and are successful translated.
#mshield
$ tcpdump -Nnti vic0
192.1.1.1.1831 > 192.1.1.64.9090: S 238919288:238919288(0) win 16384 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 3,nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 0> (DF)
192.1.1.64.9090 > 192.1.1.1.1831: S 3877516634:3877516634(0) ack 238919289 win 16384 <mss 1440,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 3,nop,nop,timestamp 1576546072 3547517653> (DF)
192.1.1.1.1831 > 192.1.1.64.9090: . ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072> (DF)
$ tcpdump -Nnti vic1
2011::64.62893 > 2011::11.9090: S 238919288:238919288(0) win 16384 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 3,nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 0>
2011::11.9090 > 2011::64.62893: S 3877516634:3877516634(0) ack 238919289 win 16384 <mss 1440,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 3,nop,nop,timestamp 1576546072 3547517653>
2011::64.62893 > 2011::11.9090: . ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072>
Listing 4.11: TCP three-way handshake translation output
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medical
device[IPv4] [IPv6]
NAT46
ext_if int_if
mShieldcustomerdevice
NAT64
NAT46
(TCP-Syn)
From: 192.1.1.1 [:1831]
  To: 192.1.1.64[:9090] (TCP-Syn)
From: 2011::64[:62893]
  To: 2011::11[:9090]
(TCP-Syn-ack)
From: 192.1.1.64[:9090]
  To: 192.1.1.1 [:1831]
(TCP-ack)
From: 2011::64[:62893]
  To: 2011::11[:9090]
(TCP-Syn-ack)
From: 2011::11[:9090]
  To: 2011::64[:62893]
(TCP-ack)
From: 192.1.1.1 [:1831]
  To: 192.1.1.64[:9090]
Figure 4.8: TODO:
#mshield
$ tcpdump -Nnti vic0
192.1.1.1.1831 > 192.1.1.64.9090: . 69165:70593(1428) ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072> (DF)
192.1.1.1.1831 > 192.1.1.64.9090: . 70593:72021(1428) ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072> (DF)
192.1.1.1.1831 > 192.1.1.64.9090: . 72021:73449(1428) ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072> (DF)
192.1.1.1.1831 > 192.1.1.64.9090: . 73449:74877(1428) ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072> (DF)
192.1.1.1.1831 > 192.1.1.64.9090: . 74877:76305(1428) ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072> (DF)
192.1.1.1.1831 > 192.1.1.64.9090: . 76305:77733(1428) ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072> (DF)
192.1.1.1.1831 > 192.1.1.64.9090: . 77733:79161(1428) ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072> (DF)
192.1.1.1.1831 > 192.1.1.64.9090: . 79161:80589(1428) ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072> (DF)
192.1.1.1.1831 > 192.1.1.64.9090: . 80589:82017(1428) ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072> (DF)
192.1.1.1.1831 > 192.1.1.64.9090: . 82017:83445(1428) ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072> (DF)
192.1.1.1.1831 > 192.1.1.64.9090: . 83445:84873(1428) ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072> (DF)
192.1.1.64.9090 > 192.1.1.1.1831: . ack 70593 win 1785 <nop,nop,timestamp 1576546072 3547517653> (DF)
192.1.1.64.9090 > 192.1.1.1.1831: . ack 73449 win 1428 <nop,nop,timestamp 1576546072 3547517653> (DF)
192.1.1.64.9090 > 192.1.1.1.1831: . ack 76305 win 1071 <nop,nop,timestamp 1576546072 3547517653> (DF)
192.1.1.64.9090 > 192.1.1.1.1831: . ack 79161 win 714 <nop,nop,timestamp 1576546072 3547517653> (DF)
192.1.1.64.9090 > 192.1.1.1.1831: . ack 82017 win 357 <nop,nop,timestamp 1576546072 3547517653> (DF)
192.1.1.64.9090 > 192.1.1.1.1831: . ack 84873 win 0 <nop,nop,timestamp 1576546072 3547517653> (DF)
$ tcpdump -Nnti vic1
2011::64.62893 > 2011::11.9090: . 69165:70593(1428) ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072>
2011::64.62893 > 2011::11.9090: . 70593:72021(1428) ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072>
2011::64.62893 > 2011::11.9090: . 72021:73449(1428) ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072>
2011::64.62893 > 2011::11.9090: . 73449:74877(1428) ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072>
2011::64.62893 > 2011::11.9090: . 74877:76305(1428) ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072>
2011::64.62893 > 2011::11.9090: . 76305:77733(1428) ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072>
2011::64.62893 > 2011::11.9090: . 77733:79161(1428) ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072>
2011::64.62893 > 2011::11.9090: . 79161:80589(1428) ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072>
2011::64.62893 > 2011::11.9090: . 80589:82017(1428) ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072>
2011::64.62893 > 2011::11.9090: . 82017:83445(1428) ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072>
2011::64.62893 > 2011::11.9090: . 83445:84873(1428) ack 1 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517653 1576546072>
2011::11.9090 > 2011::64.62893: . ack 70593 win 1785 <nop,nop,timestamp 1576546072 3547517653> [flowlabel 0xec02b]
2011::11.9090 > 2011::64.62893: . ack 73449 win 1428 <nop,nop,timestamp 1576546072 3547517653> [flowlabel 0xec02b]
2011::11.9090 > 2011::64.62893: . ack 76305 win 1071 <nop,nop,timestamp 1576546072 3547517653> [flowlabel 0xec02b]
2011::11.9090 > 2011::64.62893: . ack 79161 win 714 <nop,nop,timestamp 1576546072 3547517653> [flowlabel 0xec02b]
2011::11.9090 > 2011::64.62893: . ack 82017 win 357 <nop,nop,timestamp 1576546072 3547517653> [flowlabel 0xec02b]
2011::11.9090 > 2011::64.62893: . ack 84873 win 0 <nop,nop,timestamp 1576546072 3547517653> [flowlabel 0xec02b]
Listing 4.12: TCP data translation translation output
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medical
device[IPv4] [IPv6]
NAT46
ext_if int_if
mShieldcustomerdevice
NAT64
(TCP)
From: 192.1.1.1 [:1831]
  To: 192.1.1.64[:9090] (TCP)
From: 2011::64[:62893]
  To: 2011::11[:9090]
(TCP-ack)
From: 192.1.1.64[:9090]
  To: 192.1.1.1 [:1831]
(TCP-ack)
From: 2011::11[:9090]
  To: 2011::64[:62893]
Figure 4.9: TODO:
medical
device[IPv4] [IPv6]
ext_if int_if
mShieldcustomerdevice
NAT64
NAT46
(TCP-Fin) 
From: 192.1.1.64[:9090]
  To: 192.1.1.1 [:1831]
(TCP-ack)
From: 2011::64[:62893]
  To: 2011::11[:9090]
(TCP-Fin) 
From: 2011::11[:9090]
  To: 2011::64[:62893]
From: 192.1.1.1 [:1831]
  To: 192.1.1.64[:9090]
(TCP-ack)
Figure 4.10: TODO:
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#mshield
$ tcpdump -Nnti vic0
192.1.1.64.9090 > 192.1.1.1.1831: F 1:1(0) ack 52428802 win 32130 <nop,nop,timestamp 1576546160 3547517740> (DF)
192.1.1.1.1831 > 192.1.1.64.9090: . ack 2 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517740 1576546160> (DF)
$ tcpdump -Nnti vic1
2011::11.9090 > 2011::64.62893: F 1:1(0) ack 52428802 win 32130 <nop,nop,timestamp 1576546160 3547517740> [flowlabel 0xec02b]
2011::64.62893 > 2011::11.9090: . ack 2 win 2048 <nop,nop,timestamp 3547517740 1576546160>
Listing 4.13: TCP connection termination translation output
4.5.3 PMTUD
In both address family translation modes, the PMTUD process The issue
was reported to OpenBSD project [63].
In case of IPv6 to IPv4 translation,listing 4.14, ICMPv4 Fragmentation
Need messages were sent to the loopback interface with wrong addresses. A
ICMPv6 Packet Too Big message send back to the original sender is the
expected behavior [6].
In case of IPv4 to IPv6 translation, listing 4.14, the IPv4 DF flag is ignored
resulting in a IPv6 packet with a fragmentation header. A ICMPv4 Frag-
mentation Need message send back to the original sender is the expected
behavior [6].
$ tcpdump -Nnti vic0
192.1.1.1.6666 > 192.1.1.64.9090: udp 1440 (DF)
$ tcpdump -Nnti vic1
2011::64 > 2011::11: frag (0x4c65749a:1352@0+) 63926 > 9090: udp 1440
2011::64 > 2011::11: frag (0x4c65749a:96@1352)
Listing 4.14: PMTUD mShield outputs using NAT46 mode
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[IPv4]
IPv6 Header  -   40 bytes
Frag. Header -    8 bytes
UDP Header   -    8 bytes
Payload      - 1344 bytes
IPv4 Header  -   40 bytes
Payload      -  106 bytes
Fragment 1
Fragment 2
MTU
1400 bytes
MTU
1500 bytes ext_if int_if
[IPv4] [IPv6] medicaldevicemShield
customer
device
NAT46
(UDP - 1460 bytes)
From: 192.1.1.1 [:6666]
  To: 192.1.1.64[:9090]
From: 2011::64[:571796]
  To: 2011::11[:9090]
(UDP - 1396 bytes)
(130 bytes)
Figure 4.11: TODO:
medical
devicemShield
customer
device
ext_if int_if
[IPv6] [IPv4]
1460 bytes
From:
To:
2012::11[:6666]
2012::64[:9090]
PF+NAT64
lo0 From:To:
192.2.2.2
192.2.2.2
(UDP)
MTU
1400 bytes
MTU
1500 bytes
ICMP
need to frag
Figure 4.12: TODO:
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$ tcpdump -Nnti vic0
2012::11.6666 > 2012::64.90: udp 1440
$ tcpdump -Nnti lo0
192.2.2.2 > 192.2.2.2: icmp: 192.2.2.2 unreachable - need to frag (mtu 1400)
Listing 4.15: PMTUD mShield outputs using NAT64 mode
4.5.4 Fragmentation Handling
In the NAT46 mode, the IPv4 fragments were successful translated and
forwarded as shown in figure 4.16. Nevertheless, the IPv4 fragments are not
directly translated to IPv6. They are reassembled by PF and then translated.
Since the resulting packet is bigger than next-hop MTU, PF fragment it. For
reassembled packets smaller than next-hop MTU, even if the original packet
contains fragments, are not fragmented.
Voici du verbatim en couleur : \verb en rouge
Il y a aussi du␣bleu␣étoilé␣^_\ puis par défaut du noir ### !
Maintenant, une ligne trop longue :
cos 1 + cos 1 + cos 1 + cos 1 + cos 1 + lg 2 + exp 3 + th 4 + ln
5 + ch 6 + cosh 7 + ln 5 + ch 6 + cosh 7
#mshield
$ tcpdump -Nnti vic0
192.1.1.1.6666 > 192.1.1.64.9090: udp 1450 (frag 1:800@0+)
192.1.1.1 > 192.1.1.64: (frag 1:658@800)
192.1.1.64 > 192.1.1.1: icmp: 192.1.1.64 udp port 9090 unreachable (DF)
$ tcpdump -Nnti vic2
2011::64 > 2011::11: frag (0x5b2f5b0e:1352@0+) 57197 > 9090: udp 1450
2011::64 > 2011::11: frag (0x5b2f5b0e:106@1352)
2011::11 > 2011::64: icmp6: 2011::11 udp port 9090 unreachable
Listing 4.16: Fragmentation mShield outputs using NAT46 mode.
In the NAT64 mode, the IPv6 fragments are not properly handled, the
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medical
devicemShield
customer
device
ext_if int_if
[IPv4] [IPv6]
820 bytes
678 bytes
From:
To:
2011::64[:57197]
2011::11[:9090]
PF+NAT46
   From: 192.1.1.1[:6666]
     To: 192.1.1.64[:9090]
IPv4 Header  -  20 bytes
UDP Header   -   8 bytes
Payload      - 792 bytes
IPv4 Header  -  20 bytes
Payload      - 658 bytes
Fragment 1
Fragment 2
(UDP)
IPv6 Header  -   40 bytes
Frag. Header -    8 bytes
UDP Header   -    8 bytes
Payload      - 1344 bytes
IPv4 Header  -   40 bytes
Payload      -  106 bytes
Fragment 1
Fragment 2
130 bytes
1396 bytes
(UDP)
Figure 4.13: TODO:
packets were lost. Similar to NAT46 mode, the original fragments are first
reassembled. During the translation, the information about the original
fragments is discarded and the IPv4 DF flag is set. Such behavior will
prevent a further fragmentation. As result of a reassembled packet bigger
than next-hop MTU and DF flag active, PF tries unsuccessfully to send a
ICMPv4 error message back. The captured packets are represented in figure
4.17.
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medical
devicemShield
customer
device
ext_if int_if
[IPv6] [IPv4]
784 bytes
770 bytes
From:
To:
2012::11[:6666]
2012::64[:9090]
PF+NAT64
IPv6 Header  -  40 bytes
Frag. Header -   8 bytes
UDP Header   -   8 bytes
Payload      - 728 bytes
lo0 From:To:
192.2.2.64
192.2.2.64
IPv6 Header  -  40 bytes
Frag. Header -   8 bytes
Payload      - 722 bytes
Fragment 1
Fragment 2
(UDP)
Figure 4.14: TODO:
#mshield
$ tcpdump -Nnti vic0
2012::11 > 2012::64: frag (0xf69cc880:736@0+) 6666 > 90: udp 1450
2012::11 > 2012::64: frag (0xf69cc880:722@736)
$ tcpdump -Nnti lo0
192.2.2.64 > 192.2.2.64: icmp: 192.2.2.2 unreachable - need to frag (mtu 1400)
Listing 4.17: Fragmentation mShield outputs using NAT64 mode
A proposal patch, listing 4.18, instead of always assign the DF flag to the
translated packet, check whether the original packet contained fragments and
was reassembled. It tries to find a tag assigned during the reassembly process.
Clear the flag means to allow a further fragmentation, for instance after the
comparison with next-hop MTU.
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$ diff -u pf.c.ori pf.c.new
--- pf.c.ori Thu Nov 8 12:56:40 2012
+++ pf.c.new Thu Nov 8 13:58:46 2012
@@ -2057,8 +2057,11 @@
struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
struct icmp6_hdr *icmp;
int hlen;
+ struct m_tag *mtag;
+ int reassembled;
hlen = pd->naf == AF_INET ? sizeof(*ip4) : sizeof(*ip6);
+ reassembled = ((mtag = m_tag_find(pd->m, PACKET_TAG_PF_REASSEMBLED , NULL)) != NULL) ? 1 : 0;
/* trim the old header */
m_adj(pd->m, pd->off);
@@ -2075,7 +2078,7 @@
ip4->ip_hl = hlen >> 2;
ip4->ip_len = htons(hlen + (pd->tot_len - pd->off));
ip4->ip_id = htons(ip_randomid());
- ip4->ip_off = htons(IP_DF);
+ ip4->ip_off = htons(reassembled ? 0 : IP_DF);
ip4->ip_ttl = pd->ttl;
ip4->ip_p = pd->proto;
ip4->ip_src = pd->nsaddr.v4;
Listing 4.18: pf.c patch to clear DF flag in the case of receive IPv6 fragments
Listing 4.19 shows the result after applying the patch. The original two IPv6
fragments containing 728 and 722bytes of data, were translated to a IPv4 and
re-fragmented according to the MTU in two fragments of 1368 and 82bytes
of data.
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medical
devicemShield
customer
device
ext_if int_if
[IPv6] [IPv4]
784 bytes
778 bytes
From:
To:
2012::11[:6666]
2012::64[:9090]
PF+NAT64
From:
To:
192.2.2.64
192.2.2.2  
IPv6 Header  -  40 bytes
Frag. Header -   8 bytes
UDP Header   -   8 bytes
Payload      - 728 bytes
IPv6 Header  -  40 bytes
Frag. Header -   8 bytes
UDP Header   -   8 bytes
Payload      - 722 bytes
Fragment 1
Fragment 2
(UDP)
IPv4 Header  -   20 bytes
UDP Header   -    8 bytes
Payload      - 1368 bytes
IPv4 Header  -  40 bytes
UDP Header   -   8 bytes
Payload      -  82 bytes
Fragment 1
Fragment 2
130 bytes
1396 bytes
(UDP)
Figure 4.15: TODO:
#mshield
$ tcpdump -Nnti vic0
2012::11 > 2012::64: frag (0x8f91a9e2:736@0+) 6666 > 90: udp 1450
2012::11 > 2012::64: frag (0x8f91a9e2:722@736)
2012::64 > 2012::11: icmp6: 2012::64 udp port 90 unreachable
$ tcpdump -Nnti vic2
192.2.2.64.51790 > 192.2.2.2.90: udp 1450 (frag 7707:1376@0+)
192.2.2.64 > 192.2.2.2: (frag 7707:82@1376)
192.2.2.2 > 192.2.2.64: icmp: 192.2.2.2 udp port 90 unreachable
Listing 4.19: Patched fragmentation mShield outputs using NAT64 mode
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Not everything that can be
counted counts, and not ev-
erything that counts can be
counted.
Albert Einstein
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5.1. WALKTHROUGH
5.1 Walkthrough
In chapter 2, an overview of the IPv6 theory and security concepts is provided.
Particularly, the state of the art regarding IP translation mechanisms, namely
the NAT64 framework.
Due to the IPv4 legacy devices, the transition approach is limited to IP
translation. It can be done using the IETF proposed standard NAT64 or
other non-standard method not covered by this thesis. In the theory review, it
was observed a lack of studies about practical NAT64 deployments including
practical security or performance issues.
The chapter 3, starts by describing the methodology used in the remainder of
the document. It is composed of two main parts: a theoretical and a practical
part. In the theoretical part, an analysis of the environment and its threats
as well as a risk evaluation based on risk assessment guides [40] are presented.
The practical part, design and implementaton, belongs to chapter 4.
The role of mShield is protect medical devices from network based attacks such
as DoS attacks or malicious code propagation. Those threats surround the
environment either in the current design or in the proposed design. Most of
the security issues are related with IPv4 or IPv6 design and its implementation
vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, in the security analysis is discussed an specific
issue of current mShield design. Where it possible to trigger an DoS attack
against medical devices by employing specific packet rates.
In chapter 4, a new mShield design is presented. The biggest change is
related with moving mShield from bridge to routing mode and the necessary
address translation. For the conversion role, the stateful NAT64 approach is
proposed as the only available solution that really meets the outlined criteria
either features or constraints. Each change is discussed and justified. Their
implementation, part of this chapter, is presented in appendix B.
The performed tests revealed the expected behavior for TCP, UDP and ICMP.
Nevertheless it is still necessary some patches for PMTUD and fragmentation
support.
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5.2 Problem Discussion
Using current and open source implementations it is possible to deploy a
IPv4 to IPv6 converter box. The proposed design allows a full integration
with current mShield design. It uses the same operating system and packet
filtering mechanism instead of external tools or devices. That fact reduces the
security impact resulting from changes in the design. Nevertheless, there are
some security implications about the proposed design discussed in chapter 3.
Adding a new protocol increases the attack surface. It increases not only due
to the use of a new protocol and its flaws but also due to their implementations
and configurations.
Updating mShield to a non-transparent device, as proposed, exposes it to
network scans and can be used to explore vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, it is
unlikely that an OpenBSD vulnerability can be used to gain privileges and
compromise the environment. There are no open OpenBSD vulnerabilities
and in history its number is extremely reduced.
The network scans are possible either using IPv4 or IPv6 as well as in the
current or the proposed design. Since there are no traffic authentication,
mShield packet filtering can be bypassed using forged IP addresses. Therefore,
it is possible scan the network discovering the allowed communications. On
the other hand, vulnerabilities and malicious code exposing upper-layer
protocols affect both IP versions.
At the end, the risk associated with the use of a new IP version will not
significantly increase. A successful attack has the same impact on current or
proposed design. In the most of the cases, the difference regards about the
likelihood resulted from a bigger attack surface.
On the other hand, for the scenarios where the customer just use one IP, the
attack surface can be reduced disabling one of the IP versions on external
interface of mShield. In that case the attack surface are limited to one single
IP version.
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5.3 Main Contributions
The main contributions provided by this thesis are:
• State of the art discussion review from the IPv6 topics, such as the
NAT64 approach, to the security concepts.
• Security analysis and risk assessment of the mShield environment.
• A design proposal and implementation of mShield as an IPv4 to IPv6
converter box.
• Practical tests on the implementation and its a discussion about its
results. It includes an OpenBSD patch for PF and guidelines for the
other failed tests.
5.4 Further Work
The following topics were identified as requiring further work:
• Additional research about IPv6 concepts and design vulnerabilities.
• Additional research for features such as DNS support, traffic authenti-
cation, anti-DoS mechanisms or traffic encryption at network layer.
• The proposal design and implementation represents a first step in
the development cycle. It is necessary to develop and test additional
components such as the configuration tool or dynamic PF configuration.
• More practical tests, including performance measurements in a real
environment and reevaluation of the minimal hardware requirements.
5.5 Final Thoughts
TODO: I need to get inspired...
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